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Introduction
The question of how cooperation and social order can evolve from a Hobbesian state
of nature of a “war of all against all” (Hobbes [1668] 1982) has always been at the
core of social scientiﬁc inquiry (e.g., Axelrod 1984; Bowles and Gintis 2011; Durkheim
[1893] 1997; Ellickson 1991; Ostrom 1990; Sennett 2012). Various approaches exist for
addressing this question, but the theoretical lens through which we view the phe-
nomena presented in this book is methodological individualism (Weber [1922] 2013;
Coleman 1990). Methodological individualism reminds us that cooperation and so-
cial order are macro-sociological phenomena that can be, and need to be, explained
as a result of the goal-oriented behaviors of actors. A key insight from this point of
view is that social dilemmas constitute a pivotal analytical paradigm that can be used
by social scientists to investigate the origins of conﬂict, competition, and cooperation
among humans. Social dilemmas are therefore well suited as the micro-foundational
building blocks for a stringent theoretical explanation of cooperation and social order
(Kollock 1998).
Social dilemmas are “situations of strategic interdependence in which the deci-
sions of individually rational actors lead to an inferior outcome for all or some parties
than the decisions of ‘collectively rational’ actors. Collective rationalitymeans that ac-
tors, had they an opportunity to communicate and agree on a binding contract, should
agree on a combination of actions leading to a welfare-enhancing outcome” (Diek-
mann and Przepiorka 2016:1311). Social dilemmas, therefore, are at the core of the
problem of social cooperation. Their analysis identiﬁes when and why humans may
struggle to achieve a collectively rational solution, what societal beneﬁts they forgo in
their struggle, and what mechanisms and measures may help overcome the struggle.
Social dilemmas are usually described in game theoretic terms. Apart from
the well-known Prisoner’s Dilemma, there are many examples of social dilemmas
(McAdams 2009; Raub, Buskens, and Corten 2015). Social dilemmas are mostly stud-
ied in small groups, such as dyadic interactions with trust at stake, or voluntary con-
tribution situations inwhich a public good is produced only if enough groupmembers
contribute their resources. However, social dilemmas also occur on a large scale. The
common pool resource dilemma is often used to describe the clash between individ-
ual and collective rationality in environmental issues such as ﬁshery, land use, and
traffic (Ostrom 1990). Coordination problems, in which actors must agree on one of
many welfare-enhancing outcomes, also fall under the deﬁnition of social dilemmas.
The gap between the individual and collective rationality inherent in social dilem-
mas (Rapoport 1974) creates a demand for the regulation of actors’ behavior (Coleman
1990; Voss 2001). Such regulations can be formal andmanifest themselves in terms of
legal codes and other institutions providing selective incentives. Regulations can also,
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however, be informal, and emerge as social norms that prescribe or proscribe certain
behavior that is enforced by positive and negative peer-sanctions (Hechter and Opp
2001).
In general, whether formal or informal, such regulations can be understood as
institutions, deﬁned as “humanly devised constraints that shape human interaction”
(North 1990:3). A speciﬁc type is social norms, deﬁned as rules guiding social behav-
ior, the deviation from (or adherence to) which is negatively (or positively) sanctioned
(e.g., Bicchieri 2006). Both social norms and other institutions are subject to change,
due to technological innovations, policies and external shocks such as economic, po-
litical and environmental crises. These changes, in turn, affect the ways in which we
interact on a small and on a large scale, and how we cooperate. Thus, while the no-
tion of social dilemmasmakes problems of cooperation comprehensible, the analysis
of institutions is key to understanding the evolution of cooperation.
Against this backdrop, the chapters compiled in this book give an overview of
state-of-the-art research on social dilemmas, institutions, and the evolution of cooper-
ation. The book covers (1) theoretical analyses of social dilemmas such as trust, pub-
lic goods, common-pool resource and coordination dilemmas; (2) the role of formal
and informal organizations, social norms, and institutions in shaping how individu-
als interact to overcome social dilemmas; and (3) empirical studies conducted in the
laboratory and the ﬁeld, aswell as agent-based simulations that investigate how coop-
eration evolves in human groups. The book is divided into seven parts, and comprises
26 chapters written by distinguished scholars and experts in the ﬁeld.
Part I: Introduction
After this introductory chapter, the book begins with an article by Raub and Voss
(Chapter 2), who remind us of the theoretical roots of European rational-choice so-
ciology. While James Coleman can safely be called the father of sociological rational
choice theory, some of his ideas, and in particular the famous Coleman-boat, turn out
to have originated in Europe. Raub and Voss provide an overview of the European
antecedents of the Coleman-boat and thereby place the contributions in this book
against the context of the history of thought. At the same time, by discussing vari-
ous micro-macromodels, Raub and Voss introduce the basic ideas of methodological
individualism.
Part II: Institutions
The second part starts with a description of one of the most peculiar institutions in
human social history – the Kula Ring. The Kula Ring was a system of economic and
ceremonial exchanges among islander tribes in the Western Paciﬁc, and was ﬁrst de-
scribed by the ethnographer Bronisław Malinowski at the beginning of the last cen-
tury. It is believed that the ceremonial gift exchanges that took place alongside eco-
nomic exchanges served the function of maintainingpeace among the tribal societies.
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How the Kula Ring came into existence, however, is a yet unsolved puzzle. Ziegler
(Chapter 3) devises a simulation model that aims at identifying the conditions under
which the Kula Ring may have evolved.
Perhaps less peculiar, but at least as important in terms of their origins as the
Kula Ring, are criminal justice institutions. Starting from the observation that there is
substantial cross-cultural variability in what is considered to be a crime, Eisner, Mur-
ray, Ribeaud, Averdijk, and vanGelder (Chapter 4) challenge thewidespread view that
the evolved human psychology has had a major bearing on the prevalence of crimi-
nal justice institutions. The authors emphasize procedural fairness and legitimacy as
inherent properties of criminal justice institutions with a positive effect on maintain-
ing social order. These properties distinguish criminal justice institutions from mere
centralized punishment systems.
In a similar vein, Lindenberg (Chapter 5) argues that institutions do not regulate
actors’ behavior via selective incentives alone, but also have a bearing on actors’ per-
ceptions of the situation at hand, their beliefs about other actors, and their own mo-
tivations. The author employs goal-framing theory to demonstrate how institutions
regulate actors’ behavior via their inﬂuence on these actors’ overarching goals. He ar-
gues that the functioning of institutions crucially depends on how they inﬂuence an
actor’s three overarching normative, gain and hedonic goals. To function well, insti-
tutions must make actors’ normative goals salient and activate internalized norms to
prompt actors to act according to the legitimate rules these institutions deﬁne.
In the last chapter in Part II, Mueller (Chapter 6) gives several examples of large-
scale social dilemmas related to vaccinations against infectious agents, and shows
how the use of social dilemma theory can help to devise institutions that solve the
dilemmas inherent in vaccination decisions.
Part III: Social Norms
What one ought to do often clashes with what one would like to do. In Chapter 7, Opp
challenges the commonview that the effects of one’s inclination to followsocial norms
and one’s own interests on behavior are additive. He suggests instead that one’s in-
clination to follow social norms decreases with one’s inclination to follow one’s own
interests (and vice versa). He uses survey data on protest participation during the East
German Revolution in 1989 to test his proposition about the interaction effect of social
norms and own interests.
Own interests, however,mayalso instigate collective actionandnormative change.
In his contribution, Preisendörfer (Chapter 8) addresses the question of whether ad-
verse environmental conditions trigger affected actors’ activism, aiming at improving
their environmental conditions and changing social norms through policy interven-
tions. To test his proposition, the author uses the Swiss Environmental Survey, which
combines answers to the survey questions with objectively measured environmental
conditions in the neighborhood of the respondents.
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Social norms change as a result of institutional change. In academia, large-scale
cooperative projects involving many researchers are increasingly promoted. At the
same time, individual researchers compete for scarce, long-term academic positions
and are evaluated based on their individual performance. Cooperating with others
on a common project or working alone is therefore a dilemma with which young re-
searchers are increasingly confronted. Gross, Jungbauer–Gans, and Nisic (Chapter 9)
investigate whether the norm to cooperate with others has increased over time, and
whether researchers who cooperate with others are more successful in securing long-
term academic positions.
Another clash between social norms and own interests in academia manifests it-
self every now and then in prominent cases of scientiﬁc misconduct. For social norms
regarding scientiﬁc conduct to be established and maintained, norm violations must
be negatively sanctionedwith a certain probability; detecting anddocumenting scien-
tiﬁc misconduct is a necessary precondition for the application of sanctions. In Chap-
ter 10, Auspurg and Hinz devise and empirically evaluate new methods of fraud de-
tection in scientiﬁc publications.
Reciprocity is arguably the strongest social norm gluing a society together. Liebe
and Tutic (Chapter 11) conduct two quasi-experiments to explore the interplay of reci-
procity and social status. They use the sequential dictator game tomeasure reciprocity
and manipulate social status by allowing participants from different schools to inter-
act with each other.
Part IV: Peer-Sanctioning
Peer-sanctioning canbe effective in establishingnorm compliance, if a signiﬁcant pro-
portion of actors are willing to sanction their deviant peers at a cost to themselves.
However, the effectiveness of peer-sanctioning may not only depend on the number
of potential sanctioners, but also on the conﬂict potential inherent in actors’ diver-
gent normative expectations. In Chapter 12, Rauhut andWinter distinguish four types
of normative conﬂict that can arise from actors’ diverging expectations regarding the
type of a social norm, and the extent to which others should adhere to that norm. Ad-
ditionally, the more the actors to whom the social norm is directed are distinct from
the actors who beneﬁt from the social norm, the less effective peer-sanctioningwill be
in establishing norm compliance.
In line with the idea of normative conﬂict, Jann and Coutts (Chapter 13) provide
empirical evidence of the extent of negative peer-sanctioning in an inventive ﬁeld ex-
periment. They show how larger differences in actors’ social status can lead to more
aggressive peer-sanctions of traffic norm violations. In their experiment, a confeder-
ate seemingly unintentionally blocks a road with his or her car, and the time until the
blocked driver honks is measured. Actors’ social status is measured by the type of car.
A factor that has been shown to hamper the effectiveness of peer-sanctioning to
promote norm compliance is negative counter-sanctioning (i.e., retaliation for pun-
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ished deviations). In Chapter 14 Flache, Bakker, Mäs and Dijkstra suggest that this
may also be true for positive counter-sanctioning (i.e., reciprocation of rewarded ad-
herence). The authors stage a laboratory experiment inwhich they test this conjecture
by varyingwhether subjects can reward or punish their peers, andwhether these sanc-
tions occur anonymously or are attached to subjects’ “identities” for the duration of
the experiment.
Winter and Franzen (Chapter 15) take up the following important but often ne-
glected question concerning peer-sanctioning: who is going to sanction the norm
breaker? A group of actors who experience a norm violation by another actor may
face a coordination dilemma in which only one actor is required to sanction the norm
breaker. The authors show that this coordination dilemma can lead to the diffusion
of responsibility such that the likelihood of a sanction decreases with the number of
actors. They test this hypothesis by means of a laboratory experiment with the multi
responder ultimatum game.
In the last decade or so, research has shown how centralized sanctioning institu-
tions could have evolved to substitute the costly and therefore often inefficient peer-
sanctioning mechanism. In these studies, subjects can choose whether they want to
be in an environment with or without the possibility of peer-sanctioning. Environ-
ments employing a peer-sanctioning institution turn out to be more successful and
therefore attract more actors over time. In Chapter 16, van Miltenburg, Buskens, and
Raub conduct a laboratory experiment to investigate whether this result also holds if
the cooperation of actors is observed by their group members with some noise; with
noise, defectors are observed as cooperators (and vice versa) with a small probability.
Part V: Trust and Trustworthiness
While social norms have been called the “cement” of society, trust has been called
society’s “lubricant”. If actors know they can trust each other, social dilemmas can
be overcome more effectively because fewer transaction costs accrue from the regula-
tion of actors’ behavior. Under what conditions, however, can and do actors trust each
other? Taking a psychological perspective, Oswald and Ulshöfer (Chapter 17) distin-
guish between trust and distrust as two states of mind that are activated depending
on the risks involved in a social dilemma. In situations with small stakes, trust is the
default state of mind, whereas distrust is the default in situations with larger stakes.
The authors argue that actors are more skeptical about their interaction partners in
the state of distrust. This in turn can have a positive effect, as actors are less gullible
and more alert to signs and signals of trustworthiness in their interaction partners.
Conversely, consistent with a rational choice perspective, Przepiorka and Berger
(Chapter 18) start with the assumption that actors are in a state of mind in which they
process information about their interaction partners’ trustworthiness in an accurate
way, irrespective of whether stakes are low or high. After giving a precise deﬁnition
of the trust dilemma, Przepiorka and Berger outline the potential of signaling theory
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to explain trust and trustworthiness in social exchange. They argue that the concep-
tual distinction between signals and signs, and between the production and display
of signals and signs, can make signaling theory more broadly applicable in the social
sciences in general and in sociological scholarship in particular.
Vieth and Weesie (Chapter 19) make the point more explicit that not only stakes
determine whether someone is trustworthy or trustful, but also one’s interaction part-
ners’ discernable intentions. That is, themere act of trusting someone and promises of
trustworthiness can induce actors to be respectively more trustworthy or more trust-
ful. The authors conduct a laboratory experiment to test these conjectures, employing
a nested game design, which allows disentangling subjects’ motives and intentions in
the trust dilemma.
In the last chapter of Part V, Snijders, Bober, and Matzat (Chapter 20) highlight
once more why it is so important to study the causes of trust and trustworthiness.
More andmore social interactions are taking place online. In peer-to-peer online mar-
kets such as eBay, anonymous traders exchange goods and services across large geo-
graphic distances. The functioning of these onlinemarket platforms crucially depends
on electronic reputation systems, which allow traders to rate each other after ﬁnished
transactions and, in this way, to produce valuable information about the trustworthi-
ness of potential exchangepartners. The authors conduct an online choice experiment
in which they present subjects with eBay-like offers of digital cameras to address two
important but understudied questions: how much do positive and negative text mes-
sages, as compared to positive and negative star-ratings, affect potential buyers’ trust
in online sellers, and how can sellers rebuild their trustworthiness in their responses
to negative text messages?
Part VI: Game Theory
The three chapters in this part, although partly inspired by empirical evidence that
conﬂicts with theoretical predictions, are purely game theoretical. Nax, Murphy, and
Helbing (Chapter 21) make a case for the reconsideration of simple learning models
to explain actors’ behavior in social dilemmas. In their analysis, they focus on a set
of public goods dilemmas and the meritocratic matching mechanism. Meritocratic
matching is a mechanism by which cooperators tend to be grouped with cooperators
and defectors tend to be grouped with defectors, thereby making cooperation among
self-regarding actors possible under certain conditions. The authors argue that simple
learning models explain actors’ behavior in these types of games better than prefer-
ence-based models.
In a step-level public goods dilemma, the voluntary contribution ofm actors is re-
quired to produce the public good for the entire group of n ≥ m actors. It is usually as-
sumed that m is common knowledge. In his analysis, Bolle (Chapter 22) assumes that
m is only known to a requestor (e.g., editors asking authors for their contributions to
a collective volume) who is not part of the group, can communicate this information
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to the other actors, and beneﬁts if the public good is produced. Bolle outlines the con-
ditions under which the requestor has an incentive strategically to misrepresent the
required number of volunteers.
In the last chapter of Part VI, Gautschi (Chapter 23) analyses the trust dilemma
with hostage posting. “Hostages” are costly commitment devices that can be used by
actors to overcome the trust dilemma. The author observes that in experiments with
hostage trust games, not posting a hostage results in less cooperation than in a trust
dilemma, in which hostage positing is not an option. Given the equivalence of the
trust dilemma without hostage posting, and the trust dilemma with hostage posting
in which no hostage is placed, this empirical ﬁnding needs an explanation.
Part VII: Experimental Methods
Framing-effects are empirical effects of the “name of the game”. For example, ac-
tors behave differently in an otherwise identical social dilemma, which in one case
is called the community game and in another is called the Wall Street game. Esser
(Chapter 24) reviews the different ways in which experimental social scientists with a
proclivity for rational choice theory have reacted to framing-effects. He thereby intro-
duces the so-calledmodel of frame selection, which offers a way to integrate framing-
effects into a broader notion of rational choice theory.
Actors with social preferences are more inclined to cooperate in social dilemmas,
but not all actors have social preferences and actors’ preferences are not directly ob-
servable. However, institutions that take actors’ preferences into account can bemore
effective in providing solutions to social dilemmas. The design of such institutions
thus requires that actors’ preferences can be measured. In Chapter 25, Höglinger and
Wehrli evaluate the reliability and validity of a recently devisedmeasure of social pref-
erences, the SVO slider measure, by means of an online experiment.
Laboratory experiments with university students as participants have been the
main approach to empirical research on social dilemmas. Berger and Baumeister
(Chapter 26) address the question of how far our knowledge about behavior in social
dilemmas could be inﬂuenced, and even biased, by the way laboratory experiments
are conducted. In particular, the authors look at the effect of subjects’ repeated par-
ticipation in similar laboratory experiments on these subjects’ behavior in social
dilemmas.
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